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Abstract 
This paper makes the case that feedback processes in democratic politics - between crime rates, 
public opinion and public policy - can account for the growth of penal populism in Britain. It argues 
that the public recognise and respond to rising (and falling) levels of crime, and that in turn public 
support for being tough on crime is translated into patterns of imprisonment. This contributes to 
debates over the crime-opinion-policy connection, unpacking the dynamic processes by which these 
relationships unfold at the aggregate-level. This uses the most extensive dataset ever assembled on 
aggregate opinion on crime in Britain to construct a new over-time measure of punitive attitudes. 
The analysis first tests the thermostatic responsiveness of punitive attitudes to changes in recorded 
crime rates as well as self-reported victimisation, and then examines the degree to which changes in 
mass opinion impact on criminal justice policy.   
Getting tough on crime: policy feedback, penal populism and punitive sentiment  
 Between 1980 and 2010, the prison population of England and Wales doubled, from around 
40,000 to more than 80,000 people. A ƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŝĚĞŽĨ ‘ƉĞŶĂůƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?ǁĂƐ first identified during the 
1990s (see Bottoms 1995; Garland 2001), encapsulated in harsher sentencing, the increased use of 
imprisonment, more restrictive community orders and other innovative and experimental forms of 
crime control (e.g. anti-social behaviour orders). In the aftermath of widespread urban riots across 
Britain in 2011, the punitive response of the criminal justice system was showcased in the higher 
rate of custodial sentences for rioters compared to similar offences in the previous year (House of 
Commons Library 2011), increasing the prison population to record levels. This marked the latest 
apex of ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞƚƵƌŶ ?ŝŶĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ, mirroring similar growth of 
punitiveness and the carceral state in the U.S. (e.g., see Gottschalk 2006; Enns 2014; 2016).
1
 In 
Britain, the grip of this penal punitiveness on mass opinion and electoral politics is now perceived to 
ďĞƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ĂƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŶŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶĐĂŶƐĂĨĞůǇĚŝƐĂǀŽǁ ? ?^ƉĂƌŬƐ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, politicians from both main political parties had increasingly 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ ‘ƚŽƵŐŚŽŶĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?EĞǁďƵƌŶ ? ? ? ?   In this regard, penal populism is seen as 
an inevitable product of the intersection of democratic politics and crime, as political elites seek to 
satisfy the demand (or perceived demand) of citizens for punitive policy.  
Despite the widespread consensus over the rise of penal populism, as Enns (2014, p. 858) 
notes, there is debate over the nature and role of mass opinion in these dynamics. Some suggest 
that the public have a residual preference for punishment that is weakly related to actual rates of 
crime (e.g. Beckett 1997; Zimring and Johnson 2006; Gottschalk 2008). Others, however, more 
strongly argue that crime rates shape both public attitudes and political responses to crime (Weaver 
2007; Miller 2013; 2016). In the case of Britain, this debate is reflected in the disconnect between 
rising fear of crime (and broader concern about social disorder) and actual falls in crime rates. What 
                                                          
1
 Not all countries have experienced the sort of penal populism encountered in the U.S. (its most extreme 
ĐĂƐĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞh ?< ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?When Children Kill shows how media and political responses to 
high profile juvenile crimes differed substantially between Norway and the U.K.    
evidence is there, then, that the public has become increasingly punitive? And to what extent have 
changes in mass opinion impacted on the expansion of the criminal justice state and, specifically, the 
use of imprisonment as a means of punishment? 
 This paper sets out theoretical expectations of how feedback between crime rates, public 
opinion and public policy might account for this rising tide of penal populism in Britain. Specifically, it 
argues that the public recognise and respond to rising (and falling) levels of crime, and that in turn 
public support for being tough on crime is translated into patterns of imprisonment. If there has 
been a punitive shift in mass opinion, this should have reflected rising trends in crime rates and, in 
turn, have been reversed in response to the crime drop observed since the 1990s. This study uses 
the most extensive dataset ever assembled on aggregate opinion on crime and law and order in 
Britain (consisting of more than 2,000 survey items collated from 1938 to 2013) to construct a new 
over-time measure of punitive attitudes, contrasting the trend in favour of tougher sentencing with 
more liberal attitudes on the death penalty. It tests the thermostatic response of punitive attitudes 
to changes in crime rates, measured using official statistics at annual intervals over the long-term 
(1970 to 2013) and self-reported victimisation data at monthly intervals in the shorter-term (2001 to 
2013). It then considers the degree to which changes in mass opinion have impacted on criminal 
justice policy, specifically in relation to the incarceration rate.  
As such, ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌƚĞƐƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ-at-ǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞd by Beckett (1997) but 
upheld by Enns (2014; 2016), Miller (2013; 2016), and to some extent Baumgartner et al. (2008). 
What sets this apart from past studies is its use of both recorded crime statistics and self-reported 
victimisation data, which enable insights into both long- and short-term dynamics of the crime-
opinion-policy link at the macro-level. Our findings suggest that the public ?Ɛ punitiveness is a direct 
function of the crime rate. Further, we show that changes in the incarceration rate are associated 
with changes in punitive opinion, offering evidence of the opinion-policy link for criminal justice, as 
has been shown in the U.S. (Enns 2014; 2016). More broadly, this study is of consequence for 
understanding growth of the carceral state in other advanced democracies during this period. 
 But before introducing our data and the time series analysis, we first reflect on how theories 
of feedback in and between public policy and public opinion inform our expectations about the rising 
tide of penal populism and its impact on the criminal justice state. 
 
Punitive attitudes and the public thermostat  
Implicit to the concept of penal populism is that the public has a preference for generally 
punitive policies in the field of criminal justice. Some theorise mass opinion as having an underlying 
retributive streak that is weakly related to actual rates of crime (e.g. Beckett 1997; Zimring and 
Johnson 2006; Gottschalk 2008). The ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛappetite for punishment is thus viewed as stable and 
enduring, and not easily sated by policy-makers. The implication of this view of public opinion is that 
it is almost unavoidable that politicians will end up pandering to publics expressing support for ever 
harsher punishment. But this perspective would not imply a very dynamic interrelationship between 
crime, punitive attitudes and public policy: public punitiveness will be relatively impervious to 
changes in actual rates of victimisation (or the risk of victimisation) and policy-makers will be under 
constant pressure to pursue harsh measures  W leading to a ratchet pattern of policy responses, or 
punctuations (such as in Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
An alternative perspective suggests that public attitudes on punishment are responsive to 
actual rates of crime and victimisation (e.g. Weaver 2007; Miller 2013; 2016). Indeed, in a recent 
study Enns (2016) shows how media coverage and crime rates tend to lead support of the U.S. public 
for being tough on crime. This public responsiveness can be because rising crime rates directly 
expose people to physical and psychological harms or financial losses, or because citizens derive 
their preferences indirectly from perceptions of the wider social milieu. In line with this, we draw on 
tůĞǌŝĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? “ƚŚĞƌŵŽƐƚĂƚŝĐ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝnion to argue ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌ
punitive policies to deal with crime should recognise and adjust in response to, changes in policy. 
Even if most people would agree that crime is not desirable (a  “valence issue ? where there is broad 
consensus over policy ends, Stokes 1963) some might want the government to be doing more on the 
issue, some less. The public will have relative preferences for policy on crime. That is, they will prefer 
government to be doing more or less (for example on violent crime, vandalism or anti-social 
behaviour) relative to the status quo. According to Wlezien (1995), relative preferences can be 
theorised as the difference between some underlying ŝĚĞĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƉŽůŝcy 
and actual policy. This can be expressed:  
R = P* ʹ P.            (1) 
Where R is relative preferences, P* is some ideal level of policy and P is the current level of policy. 
Relative preferences therefore may change either as a result of change in the underlying ideal point 
or when policy differs. A substantial line of research demonstrates that this is the case across a wide 
range of policy domains (e.g. Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). It is important to note that 
changes in policy conditions are not the same as changes in policy, and this may have implications 
both for public responsiveness and representation in policy (see Jennings and Wlezien 2015).  
In the case of crime we might expect that the relative punitiveness of the public, that is the 
degree to which people think government should be more or less tough on offenders, will be a 
function of the level of crime in society at large. Specifically, the prevalence of crime (and its impact 
on citizens) should influence the unobserved ideal preference, against which relative preferences for 
policy (R) are formed. If the crime level is low, the ideal point of public demand for punitive policies 
(P*) will be lower than when the crime level is high, with the actual level of policy (P) remaining 
unchanged. This relationship should be relatively stable. If this is the case, we would also expect 
rises (or falls) in the crime rate to lead to thermostatic changes in preferences for more (or less) 
punitive criminal justice policy. So while Wlezien (1995) tests thermostatic preferences against 
changes in P (as measured with changes in public expenditure), here our assumption is that relative 
preferences for being tough on crime will respond to P*, as captured by the crime rate. (Of course, 
there may be other broader social values influencing the distribution of ideal preferences for penal 
policy as well, but we would expect at least some correspondence between punitive preferences and 
the crime rate.) 
 Of course, the relative preference for punitive policy might respond not to crime rates in the 
aggregate but rather to specific subsets of crime (Zimring and Hawkins 1997). Miller (2013; 2016) 
argues that public concern is most likely to be influenced by violent crime, specifically homicide. In 
societies with low murder rates  W and lower rates of violence more generally  W public opinion on 
punishment might, however, instead be focused on headline crime rates as indicating the level of 
lawlessness, disorder and lack of safety. Further, in countries with lower incidence of murder, any 
meaningful  ‘ƐŝŐŶĂů ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ personal risk of victimisation will be more difficult to distinguish from 
random fluctuations on a year-on-year basis. Different social groups might be more or less exposed 
to victimisation, but the evolution of preferences among  ‘ƉĂƌĂůůĞůƉƵďůŝĐƐ ? (Page and Shapiro 1992) 
implies that opinion tends to move together over time  W despite differences in the absolute level of 
preferences. This would suggest that macro-level dynamics capture the underlying processes of the 
crime-opinion link.  
ŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞmeasures is also influenced by 
the fear of crime, which is not necessarily related to rates of victimisation (e.g. Hough and Mayhew 
1983; Farrall et al. 2009). This would imply that thermostatic responsiveness of public opinion might 
be weaker on criminal justice than in other policy domains. Lastly, it may be that popular support for 
punishment is more ambiguous than often characterised, and that considering public preferences on 
a single dimension of more or less punitiveness overlooks important aspects of this link.
2
 There are 
reasons to at least be cautious, then, regarding whether public demand for being tough on crime is 
responsive to changes in social conditions. tĞĂƌŐƵĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ
would tend to be responsive to the national crime rate. This is empirically testable, of course. 
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 ĞĐŬĞƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƵƌǀĞǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ “ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?D/W ?Ĩacing the nation, a measure itself has been subject to some debate (Wlezien 2005; Jennings 
ĂŶĚtůĞǌŝĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞD/WƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŐŽŽĚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂƚŽƉƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐĂƚĂ
given moment in time, it is less reliable as a measure of preferences for analysis of representation (Jennings 
and Wlezien 2015).  
Punitive mass opinion and dynamic representation  
If public opinion is responsive to changes in the rate of crime, there is reason to expect that 
this will impact on public policy. Political actors have strategic incentives to reflect changes in 
punitive attitudes of citizens in their policy decisions. Studies of dynamic representation posit a 
feedback processes between public preferences and policy (e.g. Stimson et al. 1995; Wlezien 1995; 
1996; Erikson et al. 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). If the public adjusts its preference for more or 
less policy in a particular domain, and government responds, this is dynamic representation (Stimson 
et al. 1995, p. 543). This is consistent with the ideas behind penal populism, and accounts of the role 
of democratic politics in criminal justice (e.g. Miller 2013; Enns 2014). Office-seeking officials will 
tend to adjust their policy stance and performance on crime in view of retaining or gaining support 
at elections in the future. Given these theoretical expectations, what might be expected of criminal 
justice policy given the (claimed) punitive shift in public opinion? 
Clearly the patterns of responsiveness are going to vary according to the political and legal 
system (see Enns 2014 for discussion of the U.S. and Miller 2016 for a more comparative view). Past 
quantitative studies have revealed the influence of public opinion over aspects of criminal justice in 
the U.S. (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2008). Peter Enns (2016) specifically shows how public punitiveness 
influences change in the incarceration rate in America  W with quite profound effects for the size of its 
prison population. While many of the street-level bureaucrats in the British criminal justice system 
are largely impervious to direct public or political pressure, there are reasons to believe that aspects 
of crime control policies may be responsive to shifts in opinion (Miller 2016). Not least the example 
of the punitive response to the August 2011 riots reveals a willingness of the system to act in such a 
ǁĂǇĂƐƚŽ ‘ƐĞŶĚĂŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ? ?/ŶBritain, government has direct legislative influence over the content 
of criminal law, governing offences and sentencing. It also has direct control over spending on the 
police and prison system, as well as their management, and over the introduction of specific crime-
stopping initiatives. Elected government thus has multiple means of pulling the levers of the penal 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƐŚŝĨƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛdemand for policies that are tough on crime. The recent 
introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, in late 2012, has provided another institutional 
channel for the influence of democratic politics (though does not impact the period covered by our 
study).  
As we noted above, preferences for punitive policies and confidence in the criminal justice 
system tend to vary across social groups; an argument made by Miller (2013, p. 292). This, in turn, is 
a source of differentiated pressures on policy-makers in terms of the sorts of measures favoured 
among different communities. Studies in the U.S. have shown how race shapes debates about crime 
and punishment and patterns of political mobilisation (Gotteschalk 2008; Wacquant 2008; Alexander 
2010; Forman 2012). In other countries ethnicity may be less strongly related to these processes, or 
ethnic-racial differences may be reflected more in levels of victimisation and preferences for more or 
less punitive policies, rather than in the degree of responsiveness. For example, whilst ethnicity and 
criminal justice patterns in Britain may resemble those in the U.S. (for example black people are 
statistically more likely to be victimised, criminalised and imprisoned  W which is also the case for 
Indian and Pakistani groups) public concern about crime among different ethnic groups has tended 
to move in parallel over the past decade or so. Consequently, level differences between whites and 
blacks in Britain in support for more or less punitive policies do not discount the possibility of policy 
responsiveness to public opinion  W where there is a different equilibrium, or gap, between policy and 
preferences, but the interaction unfolds in the same way.  
 
Institutions, policy entrepreneurs and the carceral state in Britain 
Aggregate-level patterns of responsiveness are also a function of the political opportunity 
structures that arise from the interaction of institutions and political actors. These structured the 
feedback processes between public opinion and public policy in growth of the criminal justice state 
in Britain. Prior to the 1970s, crime had generally received little attention as a political issue, either 
from policy-makers or the wider public. The institutional agenda of the Home Office, the central 
government department responsible for policing and criminal justice, was to seek to reduce the 
reliance on prison due to its cost and questions over its effectiveness at rehabilitating offenders, 
compared to probation (Faulkner 2014). The liberal-progressive consensus on criminal justice was 
broadly supported by all mainstream political parties (Downes and Morgan 1997). This consensus 
started to break down in the run-up to the 1979 election, as opposition leader Margaret Thatcher 
started to highlight crime as an issue (Farrall et al. 2009).  
In this context, increasing social anxieties relating to crime (and rising crime rates) were a 
potential opportunity for vote-seeking politicians. In office, however, the Thatcher governments did 
not follow through on this tough rhetoric in focusing on crime or the criminal justice system, with 
other more immediate priorities taking precedence. As a consequence, criminal justice policy did not 
undergo the sort of radical shift that occurred in other policy domains (Hay and Farrall 2011). 
Instead, it was the Major government that presided over a critical juncture in the growth of the 
criminal justice state, from 1990 onwards. With crime rates increasing sharply, and a number of 
ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ‘ƐŝŐŶĂů crimes ?(Innes 2004) such as the murder of toddler James Bulger fuelling public 
concern, policy-makers became increasingly attentive to matters relating to crime and criminal 
justice. The Home Secretary Michael Howard and his Labour counterpart Tony Blair (who became 
leader of the Labour Party in 1994) each sought to talk up the punitive credentials of their policies to 
reflect perceived popular demand. The period from the 1980s through the mid-1990s thus is a 
critical moment in the escalation of punitive policies; where it might be expected that public 
attitudes became harsher and where policy-makers responded in turn with measures that were 
tough on crime. These are the theoretical expectations, and the political-institutional context. How 
can they be tested? 
 
Data and Analysis  
Constructing a Measure of Punitive Opinion for Britain 
The first survey of public attitudes on criminal justice was fielded by the British Institute of 
Public Opinion (which would later become Gallup U.K.) in January 1938, concerning whether flogging 
should be abolished as a punishment for offenders (see Gallup 1976). Early on, polls on crime and 
law and order were relatively rare and tended to focus on whether or not the death penalty should 
be kept or abolished (the death penalty was eventually abolished in 1965). It is possible to discern 
some long-term trends in punitive opinion from major election and social surveys like the British 
Election Study (BES) and the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS). Since 1982, the British Crime 
Survey (now known as the Crime Survey for England and Wales, CSEW), primarily a survey about 
self-reported victimisation, has also asked the public about its attitudes on aspects of the criminal 
justice system such as sentencing and confidence in the police, courts and prisons. However, most 
survey questions relating to crime/punishment have been infrequent and irregular. Additionally, the 
initial focus on attitudes towards the death penalty means that data on punitiveness more generally, 
for less serious crimes, is far thinner. The sparseness of the data makes it hard to discern long-term 
shifts in public attitudes, which may be further obscured due to sampling error. We therefore have a 
large amount of information about public attitudes on crime and punishment, observed at different 
points in time, but no single continuous measure of opinion. 
Following ŶŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁĞƵƐĞ^ƚŝŵƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĚǇĂĚƌĂƚŝŽƐĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ ?ƚŽĞǆƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĞ latent 
underlying dimension of public attitudes towards criminal justice. This captures the degree to which 
public opinion is liberal or punitive in its view on how crime should be dealt with. ^ƚŝŵƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
method is attractive because it offers a potential solution to the irregular and infrequent availability 
of nevertheless informative poll data at different points in time. The principle behind the algorithm 
is intuitive; the ratio of aggregate-level survey responses to the same question at different points in 
time provides meaningful information about the relative state of public opinion  W telling us whether, 
on average, public attitudes have become more or less punitive (see Stimson 1991, Appendix 1, and 
Bartle et al. 2011 for an extended technical discussion of the method).
3
 This extracts the underlying 
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 Each survey item can be expressed as the ratio of attitudes on crime or punishment at two points in time: a 
 ‘ĚǇĂĚ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĂƚŝŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĂŐŝǀĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶǇĞĂƌƐt+i and t+j. 
jt
it
ij X
XP

  
tendency of all survey items relating to crime and punishment, analogous to a principal components 
approach. 
We use data from British Election Study (via Bartle et al. 2011), British Crime Survey and 
British Social Attitudes Survey (see Jennings et al. 2015), and sources of poll data from Gallup (see 
Gallup 1976) and Ipsos-MORI. This identified all opinion questions relating to the sentencing and 
punishment of criminals, capital punishment, confidence in the police or criminal justice system, 
ŚŽǁƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-ƐŽĐŝĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐĂŵĞĂďƵǌǌǁŽƌĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĨŽƌ
juvenile misdemeanours and other low-level crime). Survey items are scored as the percentage of 
respondents expressing a punitive attitude or preference; for example, 75 per cent agreeing or 
ĂŐƌĞĞŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ “ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽďƌĞĂŬƚŚĞůĂǁƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŐŝǀĞŶƐƚŝĨĨĞƌƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ?
(BSAS: 1986-2012) or 65 per cent indicating that non-violent prison sentences should be shorter is a 
 “ďĂĚŝĚĞĂ ? ?^t: 1983, 1987). Again following Enns (2014), we include questions that relate to 
trust and confidence in the criminal justice system (e.g. courts, police, magistrates).
4
 The argument 
here is that lower levels of confidence in policing and criminal justice will be associated with support 
for more punitive action on crime. In total our dataset consists of 2,007 survey items observed over 
the period from 1938 to 2013. Because the vast preponderance of survey items fall within the period 
from 1980 to 2013, our analysis focuses upon this period.  
For reasons that will become clear in a moment, we estimate a measure of punitive opinion 
including and excluding survey questions relating to the death penalty. In Table 1 we report factor 
loadings of selected survey items, as well as the proportion of variance explained by the underlying 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
This enables recursive estimation of the index of punitive opinion for each survey item for each time period 
based on all data available. Because there are multiple estimates of punitive opinion (i.e. there are multiple 
survey items) and they are not all equivalent indicators of the latent construct, the dyad ratios algorithm 
estimates the squared correlation of each series with the underlying dimension and uses this to weight the 
series (Bartle et al. 2011, p. 269). This correlation is interpretable as a factor loading, and is reported below for 
selected survey items.  
4
 It might be argued confidence in the criminal justice system is not a direct measure of expressed preferences 
for punitive policy. For example, someone might have a strong preference for liberal, rehabilitation-focused 
policy but still be confident in the court system and the police. We estimated our measure of punitive opinion 
including and excluding survey items that relate to trust/confidence and find that the correlation between the 
two series is more than 0.8.  
factor. Here we see a substantial proportion of variance loads onto a single underlying dimension, 
indicating tŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨ
all variance in survey questions on crime and criminal justice, and 63.8 per cent when survey items 
relating to the death penalty are omitted. It is also evident in Table 1 that the correlation (i.e. factor 
loading) of a number of items is reversed when attitudes on capital punishment are excluded. This 
suggests that punitive opinion on the death penalty differs in a systematic and meaningful way from 
attitudes on other aspects of punishment and confidence in the criminal justice system. 
 
Table 1. Factor Loadings of Selected Question Series and the Measure of Punitive Opinion 
 Punitive Opinion 
(incl. death penalty) 
Punitive Opinion 
(excl. death penalty) 
Survey item N Correlation N Correlation 
     
CSEW: Are sentences too tough, about right or too lenient? 16 0.868 16 0.867 
CSEW: Are young offenders dealt with too leniently? 15 0.928 15 0.915 
CSEW: Would you say the police in this area do a good job or a poor job? 11 -0.963 11 0.854 
CSEW: How good a job do you think judges are doing? 11 -0.269 11 0.713 
CSEW: How good a job do you think magistrates are doing? 11 -0.769 11 0.941 
CSEW: How good a job do you think the prison service is doing? 11 -0.805 11 0.311 
BSAS: The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong 22 0.444 22 -0.724 
BSAS: For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence 24 0.914 24 - 
BSAS: People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences 24 -0.360 24 0.358 
BSAS: In favour of the death penalty for murder in the course of a terrorist act 8 0.847 - - 
BSAS: In favour of the death penalty for murder of a policeman 8 0.873 - - 
     
First dimension     
Proportion of variance explained 58.1 63.8 
N of time series 72 46 
N of survey items 2,007 1,850 
   
 
This indeed is what we observe in Figure 1, where we plot the respective series for punitive 
opinion. Retaining survey questions relating to the death penalty sees an increasingly liberal trend in 
public opinion on criminal justice, declining steadily from the 1980s. This trend can be discerned 
from the underlying survey data which reveal falling support for the death penalty. In the BSAS, this 
falls from 74 per cent support in 1986 to 55 per cent in 2012. In contrast, over the same period 
support for stiffer sentences rises from 73 per cent to 79 per cent. This is reflected in the alternative 
measure of punitive attitudes, excluding public opinion on the death penalty. This reveals a more 
cyclical trend in public attitudes, with a fall in punitiveness from the early- to mid-1980s, and then 
rising punitive sentiment that peaks around 2005. While this is consistent with claims about the 
increasing punitive tide of public opinion, the sudden reversal of this trend from around 2007/8 
onwards suggests that the irreversibility of penal populism may have been overstated. The trends 
revealed in our measure suggest that public opinion on crime exhibit important and meaningful 
over-time variation. Punitive attitudes are not immutable, and indeed there may be parallel liberal 
and punitive tides of opinion in relation to different aspects of criminal justice policy. 
 
Figure 1. Public opinion on crime and punishment, 1980-2013 
 
 
 
Explaining the Rise (and fall) of Punitive Opinion in Britain 
The next step is to tĞƐƚƚŚĞ “ƚŚĞƌŵŽƐƚĂƚŝĐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽĨƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚudes to changes in crime 
rates. In Britain, the recorded crime rate increased substantially between 1980 and the early 1990s -- 
peaking at around 110 crimes per 1,000 head of population in 1992  W and remained at historically 
high levels until around the early 2000s, before it started to fall.
5
 As is shown in Figure 2, the upward 
trend in support for being tough on crime moved largely in parallel with the recorded crime rate. 
Indeed, the correlation of the series over this period is equal to a substantial 0.61 (N=34, p=0.000). 
EŽƚĂďůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ĐƌŝŵĞĚƌŽƉ ? ?ĨƌŽŵĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ? ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƉƌĞĐĞĚĞĚĂ
decline in public support for more punitive action on crime. Recall we are interested in the degree to 
which punitive opinion reacts to changes in the actual crime rate, as well as perceptions of crime. 
 
Figure 2. Punitive opinion (excluding the death penalty) and recorded crime in England and Wales, 
1980-2013 
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 There is a high degree of correlation between the overall recorded crime rate (the largest proportion of 
which is forms of property crime) and the rate of homicide and violent crime; around 0.8 or above (p<0.000). 
We therefore test the lagged effect of the crime rate using a time series regression model in first 
differences, where change in punitive opinion at t, is estimated as a function of change in the crime 
rate in the previous year, t-1. We also test for the effect of change in fear of crime on public opinion 
(using the CSEW survey item about ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ “ĨĞĞůƐĂĨĞǁĂůŬŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĚĂƌŬĂƚŶŝŐŚƚ ?
interpolated for missing years, measured on a four-point scale from  “ǀĞƌǇƐĂĨĞ ? ? “ƐĂĨĞ ? ? “ƵŶƐĂĨĞ ? to 
 “ǀĞƌǇƵŶƐĂĨĞ ?, so higher values indicate feelings of less personal security). An Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test of the punitive opinion measure does not reject the null of the presence of unit root, and 
we thus model the variables in level form.
6
 The variables are standardised (i.e. the difference from 
the mean is divided by the standard deviation) so that relative effects can be compared. 
A?PUNITIVEt = D0 + ȕ1A?CRIMEt-1 + ȕ2A?FEARt-1 + µt 
The model is fitted with the Prais-Winsten method in order to control for serial autocorrelation of 
the residuals (µt), estimated as the first-order autoregressive process: µt = µt-1 + Ht. The results of the 
regression models are reported in Table 2. Here we see that the recorded crime rate has a positive 
and significant effect on support for punitive action on crime; a one standard deviation in the rate of 
crime leads to a 0.5 standard deviation in punitive opinion. This indicates a substantial substantive 
effect.
7
 When fear of crime is also controlled for this effect becomes weakly significant (at the 90 per 
cent confidence level), and the size of effect is slightly reduced (to 0.3).  This nevertheless suggests 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĐƌŝŵĞŝƐƚŚĞƌŵŽƐƚĂƚŝĐ P as crime rises, demand for 
getting tough on crime also increases, as crime falls so too does support for punitive measures. 
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 We also tested alternative model specifications consistent with the time serial properties of the data and our 
theoretical expectations; for example, we estimated a single-equation error-correction model including both 
first differences and lags of the crime rate and fear of crime and the lag of punitive opinion which also revealed 
a significant and positive lagged effect of the crime rate (though no effect was observed for fear of crime).    
7
 Note that when we estimate the model the homicide rate or violent crime rate as the independent variable 
instead, we observe similar but weaker results (i.e. public punitiveness appears to respond to these measures 
of victimisation, but the proportion of variance explained by the models is lower, suggesting that the headline 
crime rate is a better predictor of changes in public opinion). 
Table 2. Recorded crime, fear of crime and punitive opinion, 1981-2012 
 A?PUNITIVEt 
(1) 
A?PUNITIVEt 
(2) 
A?CRIMEt-1 0.447 0.296 
 (0.171)* (0.167)+ 
A?FEARt-1  0.401 
  (0.181)* 
Intercept -0.011 0.027 
 (0.057) (0.052) 
N  31 31 
R-squared  0.19 0.34 
Adjusted R-squared  0.16 0.29 
RMSE 0.43 0.41 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.716 1.714 
Rho -0.386 -0.507 
Start 1981 1981 
End 2012 2012 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
To further test our theoretical expectations about the reaction of punitive opinion to changes in the 
crime rate we focus in on a time period where we have more fine-grained data on crime rates and 
public attitudes (noting that our N=31 in the above analysis). In Figure 3 we plot the correspondence 
of our index of punitive opinion, estimated instead for monthly intervals between January 2001 and 
February 2013 (consisting of a total of 1,741 survey items) against the crime rate, measured with 
self-reported victimisation in the Crime Survey for England and Wales.
8
 The results here are striking: 
support for punitive measures on crime and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system track 
closely the crime rate over this twelve year period. Note that even if we plot the same relationship 
between the crime rate and the CSEW survey question regarding ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ “ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƚŽŽƚŽƵŐŚ ?
ĂďŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚŽƌƚŽŽůĞŶŝĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝĨƐůŝŐŚƚůǇǁĞĂŬĞƌ ? ? This offers 
some reassurance that the relationship observed above in Figure 2, and modelled in Table 2 are not 
artefacts of spurious relationships in the aggregate data due to a (relatively) small N. The downward 
trend in support for being tough on crime in Figure 3 is notable in light of claims of a punitive turn in 
popular opinion. 
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 This is calculated as the average number of reported incidents per respondent in the CSEW. 
Figure 3. Punitive opinion and self-reported crime in England and Wales, 2001-2013 
 
We again model the relationship between change in the crime rate and change in punitive opinion. 
This time, using a single-equation error-correction framework, we estimate the contemporaneous 
effect of change in the crime rate (A?CRIMEt), as well that lagged effect of change in the crime rate 
(CRIMEt-1), controlling for lagged values of punitive opinion (PUNITIVEt-1). The latter captures the rate 
of re-equilibration in response to a shock (i.e. the error-correction mechanism).
9
 The variables are 
again standardised so that relative effects can be compared. 
A?PUNITIVEt = D0 + ȕ1PUNITIVEt-1 + ȕ2A?CRIMEt + ȕ3CRIMEt-1 + Ht 
The results, reported in Table 3 below, again provide support for the theoretical expectation that 
punitive opinion will be responsive to the crime rate. A one standard deviation change in the self-
reported rate of victimisation leads to a 0.1 standard deviation increase in punitive attitudes on 
crime. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the lagged value of the self-reported crime rate 
leads to a 0.1 standard deviation in opinion. Additionally, the error-correction parameter (-0.121, 
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 When contemporaneous and lagged values of fear of crime are also included in the model, their effects are 
not significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. A fully specified model including the interaction of fear of 
crime and the (self-reported) crime rate provides further support for positive and significant short- and long-
run effects of the crime rate, and a slightly superior model fit (the interaction of the lag of the crime rate and 
fear of crime is negative and significant, indicating that the effect of the crime rate on punitive opinion is lower 
when fear of crime is higher). We opt to present a more parsimonious model here, but the general inferences 
remain the same.  
p<0.01) indicates that 90 per cent of a one-unit shock to punitive opinion remains after one month, 
81 per cent after the second month (0.9 x 0.9), 0.73 per cent after the third month (0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9), 
and so on. It is clear, then, that public support for being tough on crime is responsive over time to 
the rate of crime  W at least for the period in question.  
 
Table 3. Self-reported crime and punitive opinion 
 A?PUNITIVEt 
PUNITIVEt-1 -0.121 
 (0.041)** 
A?CRIMEt 0.136 
 (0.060)* 
CRIMEt-1 0.100 
 (0.043)* 
Intercept -0.013 
 (0.029) 
N  145 
R-squared  0.074 
Adjusted R-squared  0.054 
RMSE 0.348 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.753 
Start 2001 M1 
End 2013 M3 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Does Public Opinion Influence Criminal Justice Policy? 
 If public opinion becomes more or less punitive in direct response to changes in crime rates, 
it might be expected that vote-maximising politicians would, in turn, look to adjust criminal justice 
policies to offer reassurance to citizens wanting them to get tough on crime. There are many ways 
that elected representatives might look to respond to public support for tougher policies on crime, 
and these are contingent on the particular configuration of the political system and arrangement of 
policing and criminal justice. They might increase spending (if in a position to), hold hearings into the 
issue or announce crime control initiatives, engage in rhetoric about  “getting tough on crime ?, or 
make changes to the law relating to evidence or sentencing. As is the case in the U.S. (Enns 2014, p. 
862), incarceration rates provide a good measure of the punitiveness of criminal justice policy since 
policy-makers have substantial power over the creation of offences, sentencing and general rules 
around prisoners on parole and license. They also to a much lesser extent indicate the effectiveness 
of the criminal justice system as a whole in detecting and prosecuting offenders. While political 
means of influence over incarceration policy in Britain are quite direct, the absence of political 
appointees in police,
10
 prosecutors or judiciary might be expected to insulate it somewhat from 
pressures of public opinion, as observed in the U.S. (Miller 2004; Green 2015).  
 For initial analysis of dynamic representation, we use change in the incarceration rate (per 
1,000 head of population) as our dependent variable. Change in the number of new admittances to 
the prison population is preferable to measuring the current prison population level, which is a stock 
measure reflecting the accumulation of all decisions taken up to that time point. As Enns (2014, pp. 
862- ? ? ? ?ƉƵƚƐŝƚ P “ ?ŝĨ ? ? ?ƚŚĞŝŶĐĂƌĐĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƚĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƐŚŝĨƚƐŝŶ ƚ ĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƚŽƵŐŚ
ŽŶĐƌŝŵĞ ? ? ?ĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ?ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƐŚŽƵůĚĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĞ ?ĨĞǁĞƌ ?
new admittances. ? We plot our measure of public punitiveness against change in the incarceration 
rate in Figure 4.  
 
                                                          
10
 Note that our analysis relates to the period prior to introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners 
in England and Wales in November 2012.  
Figure 4. Punitive opinion and change in the incarceration rate in England and Wales, 1980-2013 
 
While the incarceration rate dances around a little more than the measure of punitive public opinion 
(understandably as the dyad ratios algorithm smooths the series to control for sampling error), this 
reveals a fair degree of covariation between the series. Indeed, the correlation between the series is 
equal to 0.47 (p<0.01).  
 To model the relationship between public punitiveness and the incarceration rate we use an 
error-correction model (ECM). Drawing on the approach used by Enns (2014), this enables us to test 
the short-run and long-run effects of our predictors of interest. Specifically, we model change in the 
incarceration rate as a function of change in and lagged values of public punitiveness and the crime 
rate, with lagged values of the incarceration rate included to control for the rate of error-correction 
(INCARCERATIONt-1). The model takes the form: 
A?INCARCERATIONt = D0 + ȕ1INCARCERATIONt-1 + ȕ2A?PUNITIVEt + ȕ3PUNITIVEt -1  
+ ȕ4A?CRIMEt + ȕ5CRIMEt-1 + µt 
The model is again fitted with the Prais-Winsten method in order to control for serial autocorrelation 
of the residuals (µt), estimated as the first-order autoregressive process: µt = µt-1 + Ht. The variables 
are standardised so that relative effect sizes can be compared. The results of a base model of change 
in the incarceration rate, presented in the first column of Table 4, suggest that public punitiveness is 
associated with increases in punishment. This finding is largely confirmed by the ECMs presented in 
the second and third columns, which reveal positive and weakly significant (p<0.1) short-run effects 
of punitive attitudes and positive and strongly significant (p<0.05) long-run effects. Interestingly, and 
in contrast to findings for the U.S. (Enns 2014, p. 866) the short-run effect of the crime rate on 
change in incarceration is negative and significant. That is, an increase in the crime rate in a given 
period is associated with a fall in the prison population (per head of general population). This is 
surprising, as it would not be expected that rising crime would be associated with falling rates of 
incarceration -- and merits further investigation. 
 
  
Table 4. Punitive opinion and changes in the incarceration rate, 1980-2013 
 A?INCARCERATIONt 
(1) 
A?INCARCERATIONt 
(2) 
A?INCARCERATIONt 
(3) 
A?INCARCERATIONt 
(4) 
PUNITIVEt 0.015    
 (0.006)*    
INCARCERATIONt-1  -0.066 -0.095 -0.072 
  (0.037)+ (0.037)* (0.076) 
A?PUNITIVEt  0.072 0.094 0.083 
  (0.040)+ (0.048)+ (0.055) 
PUNITIVEt-1  0.107 0.113 0.101 
  (0.037)** (0.047)* (0.058)+ 
A?CRIMEt   -0.184 -0.178 
   (0.075)* (0.083)* 
CRIMEt-1   -0.037 -0.013 
   (0.043) (0.068) 
A?INEQUALITYt    -0.111 
    (0.149) 
INEQUALITYt-1    -0.032 
    (0.074) 
Intercept  -0.733 0.068 0.070 0.080 
 (0.321)* (0.034)+ (0.026)* (0.032)* 
N  33 33 33 31 
R-squared  0.17 0.25 0.41 0.36 
Adjusted R-squared  0.14 0.18 0.30 0.17 
RMSE 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.816 1.830 1.800 1.807 
Rho 0.414 0.406 0.253 0.231 
Start 1981 1981 1981 1981 
End 2013 2013 2013 2013 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
As previously for our test of the thermostatic public, it is possible to focus our analysis in on a period 
where we have more fine-grained data on public attitudes and incarceration rates. This uses data on 
the total prison population from the monthly bulletins of the Ministry of Justice (and previously the 
Home Office) as well as data on crime rates from the CSEW.
11
 In Figure 5 we plot the de-trended 
measures as the prison population and punitive opinion series exhibit underlying persistence that 
may otherwise conceal the relationship of interest. The figure reveals a degree of commonality 
between the series, although public opinion is far more volatile, with the correlation equal to 0.61 
(p<0.001).   
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 We use the total prison population (including those on remand) instead of the per capita measure used for 
the analysis of annual data above because monthly estimates of the U.K. population are not published by the 
Office for National Statistics. This likely is a contributing factor in the upward trend in the prison population 
during the period. 
Figure 5. Punitive opinion and the prison population in England and Wales (de-trended series), 2001-
2013 
 
For our final test of responsiveness of the incarceration rate ƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞ
policy, we estimate another ECM including the short- and long-run effects of punitive attitudes, also 
including a control for time to capture the underlying trend in the prison population over the period 
between 2001 and 2013. We also estimate a model, report in the second column of Table 5, using a 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐƵƌǀĞǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐĂƐŬĞĚŵŽŶƚŚůǇŝŶƚŚĞ^t “Are sentences too tough, about right or 
lenient? ?dŚŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŽƵƌŝŶĚĞǆŽĨƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŚĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ
as a measure of public preferences. In terms of the results presented in Table 5, we see that punitive 
opinion has positive and significant short- and long-run effects on the incarceration rate. Further, 
the error-correction parameter (-0.316, p<0.001) indicates that shocks to the prison population are 
quickly absorbed. The control for time indicates that there is a significant positive trend in the size of 
the prison population. 
 
  
Table 5. Punitive opinion and change in the incarceration rate, 2001-2013 
 A?INCARCERATIONt 
(1) 
A?INCARCERATIONt 
(2) 
INCARCERATIONt-1 -0.316 -0.242 
 (0.057)*** (0.049)*** 
A?PUNITIVEt 0.109 0.040 
 (0.029)*** (0.014)** 
PUNITIVEt-1 0.105 0.050 
 (0.023)*** (0.014)*** 
TIMEt 0.009 0.005 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Intercept  -5.051 -3.097 
 (0.938)*** (0.685)*** 
N  145 146 
R-squared  0.253 0.184 
Adjusted R-squared  0.232 0.161 
RMSE 0.118 0.123 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.000 2.039 
Start 2001 M1 2001 M1 
End 2013 M3 2013 M3 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Together, these results provide considerable support for the theoretical expectation that public 
opinion exerts an influence over the functioning of the criminal justice system. We observe positive 
and significant effects of our measure of punitive attitudes on the incarceration rate over both the 
longer- and shorter-term using alternative measures of public preferences for policy.  
 
Conclusion 
As crime rose steadily throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s in Britain, public anxiety 
and demand for penal policies that were tough on crime grew, leading to increased attentiveness of 
government to crime and criminal justice. During the same time period, the rate of imprisonment 
ĚŽƵďůĞĚ ?ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůƐƚƌĂŝŶŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŝƐŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŝƚƐ overcrowded and 
antiquated Victorian prisons. As we have shown here, the rising tide of punitive opinion was an 
important factor in the increased use of incarceration as a policy response. Increased use of prison 
and harsher sentencing therefore reflected popular support for government being tough on crime. 
While many accounts of penal populism emphasise the politicization of the issue of crime by parties 
and politicians (Pratt 2007) evidence we have presented here suggests that the shifting public mood 
on crime preceded increases in the incarceration rate and government attention to the issue of 
crime. Public opinion was already moving in a punitive direction well before the prison population 
reached its peak. This is a significant finding, in revealing that the public recognised the crime 
problem prior to the policy response under the Major and Blair governments. At the same time, we 
have shown that the tide of punitive opinion has turned since the mid-2000s, applying a brake to (if 
not leading to a complete reversal of) the size of the prison population. Importantly, this finding 
relates to the newly sentenced population (as shown in Figure 4), whereas the size of the total 
prison population in Britain continues to rise; for a number of reasons, including longer sentence 
lengths, greater numbers of convictions for sexual offences and increasing numbers of prisoner 
recalls.   
 Our analysis is based on new dataset on public attitudes on crime and punishment in Britain 
that is unprecedented in its scope, consisting of more than 2,000 observations of aggregate-level 
survey items. This enabled us to determine whether there has been a punitive shift in opinion; and 
we provide some support for this claim. We also found, however, that public support for being tough 
on crime has declined over the past decade, in parallel with falling crime rates. In sum, the findings 
offer substantial support for the thermostatic theory of public opinion, applied to the policy domain 
of criminal justice in the case of Britain (between 1980 and 2013). Alongside this, the results reveal 
that public punitiveness does influence the incarceration rate. This is consistent with the findings of 
Peter Enns (2014; 2016), which reveal that the rise of mass incarceration in the U.S. was a response 
to an increasingly punitive public. Importantly, it is change in the incarceration rate which responds 
to public opinion, highlighting a constraint of responsiveness in this policy domain. Cross-national 
similarities here point to the prospective value of future comparative investigation. Of course, the 
trajectory of penal populism may be very different in other settings.  
 The methodological approach adopted for our analysis leaves a few questions unanswered. 
KŶĞŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŽŵĞƉŽůŝĐǇĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŵŝŐŚƚƐƚĂƌƚ ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ?&Žƌ
instance it is well-established that economic conditions are a contributing factor to crime rates (e.g. 
Jennings et al. 2012), and it therefore might follow that decisions in relation to management of the 
economy may impact on policy in other domains, e.g. crime, leading to public demand for policies 
ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƚŽƵŐŚĞƌŽŶĐƌŝŵĞ ?dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐŝƚƐŽǁŶĐĂƵƐĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞŝƐŶŽƚŶĞǁ ?tŝůĚĂǀƐŬǇ 
1979). Another question relates to whether media, politicians or organised interests might still lead 
public attitudes on crime, and the public responsiveness that we observe is driven by omitted 
variables reflecting elite mobilization of mass opinion (Farrall et al. 2009 Chapter 2 argues that might 
well have been the case for Britain in the 1980s with regards to crime, for example; see also Lee 
2001). As Enns (2016) shows, media coverage of rising crime was a factor in the long-term punitive 
shift in U.S. public opinion. While we cannot be sure, the similar findings observed over the longer-
term (from 1980 to 2013) and the shorter-term (from January 2001 to March 2013), where the time 
series are a function of different data-generating processes (recorded crime rates compared with 
self-reported victimisation rates), should provide confidence that the rise and fall of public 
punitiveness fits with the theoretical expectations of thermostatic opinion. This also underpins a 
possible argument that penal populism was simply a strategic response of policy-makers to the rising 
punitive tide of mass opinion, but that as crime rates have fallen (some might argue due to the 
increasingly tough policies on crime) this thirty year trend has started, albeit it slowly, to reverse, 
and increasingly liberal public attitudes on crime have contributed to stabilisation of the prison 
population (even if this stabilisation is at historically high levels). How long this apparently liberal 
turn in public opinion lasts may have significant impacts in the long-term on the culture of control 
and potentially the rolling-back of the criminal justice state in Britain.  
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